The Pentagon’s New Submarine Czar

In Washington, the creation of a “czar” usually signals both urgency and frustration. The Pentagon’s decision to appoint a three-star admiral to oversee all submarine construction reflects a growing alarm over America’s ability to build the undersea fleet it needs.

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‍A System Falling Behind

‍The new Submarine Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) will report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, cutting through layers of Navy acquisition bureaucracy. The mandate is broad: set requirements, manage budgets, and oversee the Maritime Industrial Base Office, which channels billions of dollars to suppliers struggling to keep pace with demand.

The urgency is clear. The Navy is delivering barely 1.3 Virginia-class submarines per year, far short of the two-plus that strategy requires. The Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine, centerpiece of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, is already running up to two years late. For the Pentagon, these delays are more than industrial hiccups—they are strategic liabilities.

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‍Centralizing Authority

‍By elevating the DRPM to report directly to the Deputy Secretary, the Department of Defense is betting that centralization will succeed where traditional program offices have failed. The model echoes the legendary Admiral Hyman Rickover, who built the nuclear navy with near-dictatorial authority. His approach delivered unmatched technical achievements but came at the cost of friction within the services and civilian leadership.

Whether today’s czar will replicate Rickover’s success—or his controversies—remains to be seen. Critics worry that creating yet another layer of authority could complicate rather than streamline. Yet Pentagon leaders believe delay is no longer an option. Similar czar roles are already being discussed for the Air Force’s B-21 bomber and Sentinel ICBM.

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‍Industrial Base at the Breaking Point

‍At the heart of the problem lies America’s defense-industrial base. Shipyards in Connecticut and Virginia are straining to increase capacity, while hundreds of suppliers across the country—many of them small and specialized—face workforce shortages, financial stress, and production bottlenecks. The DRPM will be expected to use both carrots and sticks: subsidies to stabilize fragile suppliers, and direct oversight to hold contractors accountable.

For Congress, the stakes are equally high. Billions have already been poured into expanding submarine production, but without measurable results. The new structure is likely to draw close scrutiny on Capitol Hill, especially if costs rise further without visible gains in output.

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‍Samuel Group D.C. Insight

‍The submarine czar represents more than a bureaucratic reshuffle; it is a test of America’s credibility as a naval power. The United States cannot afford to fall short on its submarine fleet—not when rivals are modernizing and expanding at pace. Success will depend not only on a single admiral’s authority but on whether industry, Congress, and the Pentagon can align behind a common goal: restoring America’s undersea advantage.

At the Samuel Group in Washington, DC, we help clients understand and anticipate these shifts in U.S. defense policy, industry oversight, and acquisition reform—ensuring they remain aligned with the Pentagon’s priorities at a time of rapid change.